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HARLES Myers became one 
of the founding fathers of British
psychology (see Costall, 1998) 
as a result of going on an expedition to the
Torres Straits (off New Guinea) organised
from Cambridge University. As Richards
(1998) wrote, ‘for Myers the Expedition
was an epochal experience, deciding him
on a psychological career’. However, it is
interesting to note the different outcome 
of that expedition for Myers (and also for
Rivers, one of the founders of the BPS)
compared with that for McDougall (also 
a founder of the BPS). McDougall, and
hence perhaps his pupil Cyril Burt, saw
evidence in their data for the genetic
determination of cross-cultural cognitive
differences. Myers, and hence perhaps 
his pupil Frederic Bartlett, saw the
methodological impossibility of
satisfactorily transferring experimental
psychology from the laboratory to the 
field.  Myers realised that their data 
were unreliable. As Richards wrote of the
published work from the expedition, ‘the
Reports thus became a virtuoso exercise in
the art of writing up unsatisfactory research
as positively as possible short of outright
dissembling’ (p.145).
My own work on names and knowledge
has to a great extent also been based on
work in New Guinea, but in the hundred
years that separate the two research
enterprises it has become possible to
conduct studies with the proper control 
that Myers realised was lacking in their
work. To investigate the colour naming 
and memory of a remote people in New
Guinea, my PhD student (Debi Roberson)
used a solar-powered light box and
computer to present stimuli under
controlled conditions. Those studies
showed that colour categories result 
from the colour terms in the speaker’s
language (Davidoff et al., 1999; Roberson
et al., 2000).
Part of a more general debate about the
relationship between language and thought,
the question of whether the language
available to describe the perceptual
experience of colours can influence that
experience is an intriguing one.
Historically, the debate was characterised
by the dichotomous views that thought 
(or, in our particular instance, colour)
categories are either shaped by language
(often called the Whorfian or linguistic
relativity view) or completely independent
of it (Berlin & Kay, 1969). Recent
systematic investigations of the relationship
between language and thought have
provided evidence for both views, and the
field of colour categorisation has provided
a rich testing ground for the effects of
language on perception. 
Cultures and categories
While the physiological basis of colour
vision is the same for all humans with
normal trichromatic colour vision, there 
is considerable diversity in the way that
different languages segment the continuum
of visible colours. Some languages have
been reported to use as few as two terms 
to describe all visible colours (Heider &
Olivier, 1972). Others have been reported
to use between three and eleven (Berlin &
Kay, 1969). This variability exists just for
those terms deemed by Berlin and Kay to
be ‘basic’ (monolexemic, present in the
idiolect of all observers and not subsumed
within the meaning of other terms). 
With Debi Roberson and Ian Davies,
(Roberson et al., 2000) I reported a series
of experiments that set out to replicate 
and extend the work of Rosch Heider in 
the early 1970s (Heider & Olivier, 1972).
Heider’s experiments had been particularly
influential in promoting the view that
language and cognitive experience are
largely independent (in some cases,
orthogonal). We found substantial
differences in perceptual judgements and
memory performance between a language
with 11 basic colour terms (English)
one with only five (Berinmo). Our results
suggested that language not only facilitates
memory performance but also affects the
perceived similarity of perceptual stimuli.
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The kinds of experiments we carried out
can be illustrated from a study in which we
asked people to divide colour patches into
two groups. To an English speaker, these
could easily be classified as a green group
and a blue group. To the Berinmo, who use
the same word for the colours that we call
green and blue, the classification was not
obvious. There was no instinctive
appreciation that blue and green were
different categories. Then, using colour
patches that crossed a boundary in their
language, we were able to reverse the
outcome. The English speakers, who used
the same word for colours that crossed the
Berinmo colour boundary, found it
relatively difficult to learn the appropriate
category for each colour patch whereas 
the Berinmo found the task relatively easy.
The cross-lingual research has been
continued in our recent studies with the
Himba in Namibia. Here we were able 
to follow the progress of children as they
acquired colour names. Our previous
research with adults mostly used memory
errors as the main data to argue for
linguistic relativity; however, what
appeared to be errors particular to a
language might merely derive from the
participant using a verbal code to
remember colours. So, language-based
memory errors might not necessarily
contradict the universal account of colour
categories. However, these arguments
against memory errors cannot apply to
children who do not know colour terms. 
The results showed that the pattern of
memory errors was very similar in English
and Himba children with no colour term
knowledge. Crucially, neither pattern
resembles that derived from the 11 basic
categories of English. The errors were
based on perceptual distance rather than 
a particular set of predetermined categories.
Thus, before the child has acquired any
colour terms there is no evidence of any
innate categorical organisation.
Of particular interest was children’s
performance, as they acquired colour
names, in their attempts to remember a
navy blue which lies perceptually between
the English prototype blue and black. For
English speakers, this colour is, of course,
in the same category as the prototype blue.
For Himba speakers, however, it is in the
same category (name) as black. Within the
set of colour patches to be remembered,
there was a closer perceptual alternative to
the navy blue than either of these; this was
purple. If choices were only influenced by
perceptual similarity the purple should be 
a more frequent erroneous choice than
either the prototype blue or the black, for
both populations. In both populations of
children, the errors made to the
perceptually closer (purple) colour
increased over the first two years of testing.
Then, in the third year, as the children
acquired colour names, the errors diver
The English children confused the navy
blue with the prototypic blue; the Himba
children confused it with black.
Clues from neuropsychology
The impetus for the cross-lingual research
into colour naming actually came from
neuropsychology. The inability to carry out
tasks requiring categorisation is a common
consequence of aphasia (total or partial loss
of the ability to use or understand
language), and historically impairments 
on categorisation tasks were considered
crucial to the debate concerning the
relationship between impaired language
and thought. Strong opinions were
expressed in the early days of modern
neuropsychological research: the argument
was considered one of the most crucial in
neuropsychology, surfacing many times in
the subsequent 100 years. On the view that
related aphasia to conceptual impairment,
the two disorders have been seen variously
to derive from a more general impairment
in the use of symbols and from impaired
abstraction and categorisation capacity
(Goldstein, 1948). 
The categorisation tasks employed by
Goldstein were used in a few subsequent
studies. For example, De Renzi et al.
(1972) asked participants to sort skeins 
of coloured wool and found some (those
unable to name and deemed to have
anomic aphasia) were unable to do so
despite normal colour vision. However,
concluded that the ‘reason for aphasics’
poor performance is not clear’ (p.147).
Impaired categorisation was also restricted
to anomic aphasia by Caramazza et al.
(1982), who commented that ‘the strongest
statement that can be made at this time is
that the type of semantically based def
we have uncovered appears to be associated
with some types of posterior pathology
not with all posterior lesions’ (p.186). 
A little more progress on clarifying the
limits of categorisation in anomic aphasia
was made by Roberson et al. (1999). In our
examination of the conceptual abilities of 
a patient (LEW), we noted two contrasting
patterns of performance. Whereas the
patient was able to divide objects by some
categorisation instructions, he seemed
unable to do so and even bewildered by
others. He excelled at sorting pictures of
animals into those that were foreign and
those that were British, but despite his
excellent colour vision, acuity and
otherwise excellent comprehension, he
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struggled with perceptual categorisation
tasks (sorting colours and facial
expressions) into as many groups as he
thought appropriate. 
The apparently simple tasks of colour
sorting completely defeated LEW unless
the stimuli were arranged so that
categorisation could be achieved by his
intact perceptual (colour) discrimination.
Thus if colour samples were presented 
for which the within-group similarity 
was much greater than the between-group
similarity (i.e. narrow ranges of reds,
greens, yellows and blues), he sorted 
them into four groups without error.
Nevertheless, his performance was
abnormal because he used a slow pairwise
comparison for each stimulus; the colour
groups did not ‘pop-out’. His abject failure
was for tasks where within-group colours
had a wide range of lightness and
saturation; in those situations, assessing
visual similarity is extremely difficult. 
In any case, even if LEW could have
computed visual similarity, it is not a
procedure that would have resulted in
normal colour categories. In terms of
perceptual discrimination, a colour that 
we call pink could be closer to a colour 
we call yellow than to a colour we would
call red.
The failure of LEW at perceptual
categorisation tasks is extremely important
and leads directly to the conclusion that it
depends on language. To understand the
connection, it is necessary to realise that
the tasks which LEW could not do use
continuous variables that fundamentally
reduce the ways in which categorisation
can be achieved. For such variables, purely
perceptual categories are an impossibility
because categorisation from continuously
varying stimuli cannot be achieved solely
by perceptual means. 
If purely perceptual categories were
possible, it would wrongly imply that
colour is immune from what is classically
known as the Sorites paradox. The paradox
becomes apparent from a thought
experiment. Suppose we alter a colour 
(say, one that we would call red) by
imperceptibly reducing the wavelength. We
would be forced to call the second colour
by the same name (i.e. red). The process
could then be repeated by again reducing
the wavelength by an imperceptible
amount. Again, we would have to admit
that the third colour should be given the
same name as the second. Continuing this
procedure many times, one would have to
finally, and paradoxically, admit that blue
colours should be called red. The paradox
can only be avoided by introducing some
non-perceptual mechanism (e.g. names or
rules) into the categorisation process. 
we would argue that colour categorisation
is essentially a rule-governed procedure.
Colours may be assigned to a category on
the basis of similarity, but it is similarity to
an arbitrarily defined (named) colour (see
Roberson et al., 1999). 
The inability of the patient to sort
colours arises because of his inability to
follow a rule- (name)-governed procedure.
If one views colour naming as rule
following, then we can more clearly see
why it is language-based and therefore why
different colour categorisation tasks are
easy or difficult for the Berinmo, Himba,
and indeed for us. Other types of naming
task are different and are usually associated
with lots of associated knowledge. Fo
those tasks, one can use knowledge to
accomplish the categorisation. Indeed,
when LEW was asked how he sorted
pictures of animals into those that were
foreign, he pointed to the correct examples
and said the one word ‘Zoo’.
So we now believe (Davidoff &
Roberson, 2004) that our cross-cultural
research provides evidence for two
distinctly different types of thinking:
concrete vs. abstract. Future research
should be of interest to a wide range of
psychological practice.
■ Jules Davidoff is Professor of
Psychology at Goldsmiths College,
University of London. E-mail:
pss01jd@gold.ac.uk.
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